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ABSTRACT 
This article addresses the issue how, in traditional Chinese society in which Con-
fucianism held a dominant position, philosophy was organized in ‘schools of 
thought,’ how these schools remained relatively stable ‘transmitters of wisdom,’ 
and how they dealt with ‘science’. More precisely, it is argued that the kind of 
‘cosmological Confucianism’ that became the state orthodoxy of imperial China 
is a kind of correlative thinking that accepts a close relation between the natural 
and the political world. In a context in which ‘philosophers’ increasingly became 
advisors to the political elite in their performing of their duties of maintaining 
cosmic order, the ruling elite came to depend on the advice of these ‘philoso-
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28 B. DESSEIN 
phers,’ while ‘philosophers’ depended on the elite for their livelihood. When, 
analoguous with the imperial administration, bureaucratization also came to 
characterize the philosophical ‘profession,’ philosophy became organized in 
‘schools’ of thought whose aim it was to transmit knowledge based on books and 
accepted as truth by teacher and disciple. In this intellectual scene, it is no sur-
prise that early scientific writings show government influence, especially in such 
fields of science as astronomy, as these are seen as essential for the operation of 
the state. This article thus claims that, in the same way as the Chinese political 
and social model is a model aimed at the status quo, also the traditional scientific 
model spirals around a status quo. In this claim may lie one element of a larger 
answer to Needham’s question why ‘modern sciences’ did not develop in China. 
1 Introduction 
Joseph Needham’s question why modern sciences did not develop in 
China and his answers to this question have been the subject of many 
scholarly articles and monographs. This article deliberately does not re-
iterate this “Needham question” as such. As the concept ‘science’ is very 
difficult to define, and as the Needham question as formulated above has 
to be fragmented into a number of sub-questions relating to the position 
of science in society, the impact of political philosophy on scientific insti-
tutions, etc., questions the solutions of which provide partial answers that 
have to be amalgamated before a conclusive answer to Needham’s ques-
tion may be formulated,1 this article contributes to a possible formulation 
of an answer to one such sub-question: Why have China’s intellectual 
practices remained relatively stable in the course of time? To formulate 
an answer to this question, this article contextualizes the formation of the 
‘New Text School’ of Confucianism in the political and social environ-
ment of Han Dynasty China (206 B.C.E. - 220 C.E.) It was during the 
Han Dynasty that the ‘New Text School’ was elevated to orthodox status, 
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and that the philosophical ‘profession’ was organized – or was at least 
presented to be organized – in ‘schools of thought’. This article therefore 
addresses the question why, in the course of time, these ‘schools of 
thought’ remained relatively stable ‘transmitters of wisdom,’ and the 
question how these ‘schools’ dealt with ‘science’.  
This article first describes the political and social environment in 
which Confucianism was formed, and became accepted as the state doc-
trine of imperial China. In this, the philosopher Dong Zhongshu is the 
main point of attention, as it is his interpretation of Confucianism that 
became the orthodox one. Hereafter, the attention is shifted towards a 
description of the position of the philosopher in China, and the organiza-
tion of the philosophical profession. The final part of this article deals 
with the impact Confucianism and the organization of philosophy in Chi-
nese society have had on the development of science. 
2 The Political and Social Environment of Confu-
cianism 
Rationality and argumentation, two elements that are of crucial impor-
tance for the development of any philosophical tradition, “arise when a 
thinker seriously contemplates the pervasiveness of the possibility that he 
may be wrong, that he needs reasons and arguments to support the validi-
ty of his views”. (Harbsmeier 1998, p. 261) The question on the rise of 
‘philosophy’ thus is a contextual one: when were circumstances such that 
‘philosophers’ were confronted with the possible fallibility of (their) tra-
ditional concepts, and / or with the need to convince others of the cor-
rectness of their views.2 
Around the 6th. century B.C.E. – the famous ‘Achsenzeit’ as coined 
by Karl Jaspers – in the Western, Indian, and Chinese cultural contexts, 
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30 B. DESSEIN 
similar philosophical theories on the universe and mankind were pro-
posed.3 This period of Chinese history became known as the period of the 
‘One Hundred Philosophical Schools,’4 and is, on the political level, cha-
racterized by an increasing unrest, eventually leading to military con-
quest, at the end of which China was for the first time unified as an em-
pire under the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.E.).  
It is this context of social and political unrest that provided the pre-
mises for the beginnings of ‘philosophy’ in China. No matter how differ-
ent in their approach to the contemporary situation the different Chinese 
‘philosophies’ that developed in the 6th and early 5th centuries B.C.E. 
were, they also share the characteristic that they are oriented towards the 
past, rather than towards the future (Bauer 2006, p. 37): Chinese ‘philo-
sophers’ aimed at reconstructing some glorified historical period, predat-
ing the political and social turmoil of their time. This determination ex-
plains why, rather than the authority of demonstration, it was sagely ori-
gin that determined a statement’s authority.5 It is this orientation towards 
the glorified past that is one of the major differences with the philosophi-
cal tradition of ancient Greece. As a result, the art of formal proof was 
little developed in China, and rigid rationalism demanding formal proof 
in formal contexts, remained a marginal phenomenon.6  
The only Chinese philosophy that did not model itself on a historical 
example was the Legalist philosophy of Han Feizi (? - 233 B.C.E.). For 
Legalists, the actual state of society proved that man’s innate nature was 
bad, and that only laws could organize society. It is this Legalist philoso-
phy that was promoted as state orthodoxy in the first empire, the Qin 
Dynasty. 
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For the Confucianists, the fall of the Qin Dynasty after having been in 
rule for only 15 years, was a proof that the Legalist philosophy that de-
nied the authority of the words and the moral example of former wise 
kings, was unsuited to serve as political philosophy. Hence, Confucian-
ism came to the forefront in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E. - 220 C.E.), 
and became the official orthodoxy in 136 B.C.E.7 Many hypotheses have 
been formulated as to why Confucianism could establish itself as such. 
Apart from the proven failure of the Legalist philosophy in ruling a state, 
one other possible reason may be that its accentuation of a government 
through ‘humaneness’ (ren) was an excellent instrument to legitimate the 
dynasty, as its founders were of non-noble descent. On a pair with this, 
the new Han imperial court appointed functionaries in state organizations, 
selected on the basis of their degree of education and their moral beha-
vior. From this habit developed the Confucian examination system (es-
tablished in 124 B.C.E.), and was established the ‘National University’.8 
The Confucian philosopher who has been most important for crafting 
Confucian state orthodoxy is Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179 - ca. 104 B.C.E.).9 
His philosophy has become known as the Confucianism of the ‘New Text 
School’.10 His “Chunqiu fanlu” (“Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Au-
tumn Annals”), a work consisting of eighty-two short essays on philo-
sophical and political subjects, is conceived as a commentary on the Con-
fucian Classic “Chunqiu” (“Spring and Autumn Annals”), the history of 
the petty state of Lu, birthplace of Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.), from 
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722-481 B.C.E.11 For Dong Zhongshu, this Confucian historical classic is 
not a mere account of events in the human world, but also refers to the 
realm of nature.12 In his “Chunqiu fanlu,” he therefore draws analogies 
between heaven – the collective of deceased ancestors, earth, and man.13 
In doing so, Confucian concepts are combined with ideas adopted from 
the Yin-yang School, from the School of the Five Phases (wu xing) – 
including their cyclical concept of history, and a variety of numerical 
theories were included. In this way, a holistic world view was moulded. 
In Dong Zhongshu’s philosophy, the universe is an organic whole, an 
‘organism’ in which every part is interrelated with every other part. So-
cial order has to ensure that the relations between all constituent parts are 
kept in harmony. In conformity with early Confucian concepts, the words 
of the early sages are seen as normative, and it are these words on which 
social order has to be modeled. To speak with Wing-tsit Chan 1963, p. 
271: 
The universe is treated as an organic whole. In his belief, not only are 
things related generally, but they are so in exact detail; and not only do 
things change, but they activate each other. The theory that things of the 
same kind energize one another presupposes an organic structure and a 
pre-established harmony. The correspondence of man and Nature is now 
reduced to numbers. Nature can always influence man through portents 
because the same material forces of yin and yang govern both of them. 
Because heaven, earth, and man all form an organic whole, it is the task 
of the ruler, wang, to preserve the harmony in this organism. He does so 
by behaving benevolently, i.e. by ruling in a humane (ren) way. There-
fore, Dong Zhongshu states (Ershi’er zi 1988, 794b): 
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When the ancients invented writing, they drew three [horizontal] lines 
which they connected through the center [by a vertical stroke], and then 
called this ‘wang’ (ruler / king). These three lines represent heaven, earth, 
and man, while the connecting of them through the center represents the 
way (dao) of [the ruler]. Who, if not a ‘wang,’ could take the central posi-
tion between heaven, earth, and man, so as to connect and council them? 
Therefore, a ‘wang’ models himself on heaven. He takes its seasons as his 
model, and gives them completeness. He models himself on its com-
mands and circulates them among all men. He models himself on its nu-
merical [categories] and uses them when initiating affairs. He models 
himself on its dao and thereby brings his administration into operation. 
He models himself on its will and, with it, attaches himself to humaneness 
(ren). 
As the ruler models himself on heaven to serve the people, this explains 
why (Ershi’er zi 1988, 794c): 
The ruler’s likes and dislikes, joy and anger, are equivalent to heaven’s 
spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Heaven accomplishes its work 
through the changes of warmth, coolness, cold, and heat. When heaven 
brings forth these four [seasons] at the proper time, the year is fine; when 
untimely, it is bad. When the ruler of men brings forth his four [qualities] 
as to righteousness, the world is well ordered; when unrighteous, it falls 
into disorder. Therefore, a well-ordered world is the same as a good year, 
and a world in disorder is the same as a bad year. In this may be seen how 
the principle of man models itself on the dao of heaven. 
These numerical categories are further developed in the following (Er-
shi’er zi 1988, 793c): 
Heaven has ‘five phases’ (wu xing): the first is wood, the second is fire, 
the third is earth, the forth is metal, the fifth is water. Wood is the starting 
point of the cycle of the five phases, water the final point, and earth the 
center of the five phases. [...] Wood occupies the East, where it rules over 
the forces of spring; fire occupies the South, where it rules over the forces 
of summer; metal occupies the West, where it rules over the forces of au-
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tumn; water occupies the North, where it rules over the forces of winter. 
Therefore, wood rules over the production of life and metal rules over its 
destruction; fire rules over heat and water over coolness. [...] Earth occu-
pies the center and is called ‘heavenly fertilizer’. 
and (Ershi’er zi 1988, 808b-c): 
Heaven, earth, yin and yang, and wood, fire, earth, metal and water are 
nine; together with man, they are ten. [...] In the universe, there are the es-
sences yin and yang. Human beings are constantly drowned in them. 
Put differently, it is because the ruler knows heaven that he can act as 
representative of heaven on earth, thus maintaining good order in the 
cosmos. This includes the social structure of society, as is evident from 
the biography of Dong Zhongshu, included in the “Qian Han shu” (“His-
tory of the Former Han”) (1986, Vol.1, 600b): 
 
The mandate of heaven (tianming) is a decree (ming). This decree cannot 
operate except through the sage (shengren). The ‘basic stuff’ in its raw 
state is ‘nature’ (xing). This nature will not attain accomplishment when 
not changed through instruction. Man’s desires are ‘feelings’ (qing). 
When feelings are not regulated by [human] institutions, they will not be 
appropriated. Therefore, a ruler (wang) is respectful in undertaking the 
mandate of heaven above, thus operating in conformity with the decree; 
and is busy with changing through clear instruction below, so that the 
people accomplish their nature. He adjusts his laws and rules according to 
what is appropriate, and he differentiates the hierarchy of upper and lower 
[social classes], so as to appropriate their desires. By practicing these 
three things, the great fundamental basis [of society] is initiated. 
In Dong Zhongshu’s holistic worldview, political institutions have to 
correspond to the numerical categories of the universe (Ershi’er zi 1988, 
784b-c): 
  
 
 
 
COSMOLOGICAL CONFUCIANISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 35 
When appointing his officials, the king (wang) nominates three higher 
ministers, nine lower ministers, twenty-seven great-officers, and eighty-
one officials of first class: a total of one hundred and twenty persons with 
which the hierarchy of ministers is completed.14 I have heard that the 
model that the wise kings hereby use, is the process of heaven. [...] That 
three men form the first selection [of officials], is based on the fact that 
three months form one season. That four such selections are made, is 
based on the fact that four seasons complete a year. The three highest mi-
nisters are the men by whom the king supports himself. Heaven com-
pletes itself by three (i.e. heaven, earth, and man), and the king supports 
himself by three. When this complete number is established and the 
process of selection is multiplied four times, there can be no error. The 
significance of arranging heaven’s numerical categories for participation 
in [human] affairs, is that the government should be conducted with care-
ful attention to the dao. [...] Does not the fact that there is one yang (for 
spring), but three spring [months covered by it], derive from the appro-
priateness of three? Heaven then multiplies this by four (the number of 
the seasons), the number [of months] being identical [for each season]. 
Heaven has its four seasons and the seasons have their three months. [...] 
In the fact that three ministers constitute one selected group, and that the 
process of selecting is limited to four, lies the complete expression of the 
characteristics of man. 
Heavenly signs will announce disharmony in the cosmos (Ershi’er zi 
1988, 788b): 
Generally put, when things in heaven and on earth have abnormal 
changes, this is called ‘strange occurences’ (yi); when changes are small, 
this is called ‘calamity’ (zai). ‘Calamity’ always comes first, and is fol-
lowed by ‘strange occurences’. 
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Agreeing with Joseph Needham, Benjamin Schwartz has labelled this 
‘cosmological Confucianism’ a kind of ‘phenomenalist philosophy,’ 
whereby ‘phenomenalism’ is understood as “essentially a belief that 
‘governmental and social irregularites’ can lead to vast dislocations in 
nature”. (Schwartz 1985, p. 364) In the correlative thinking that charac-
terizes Dong Zhongshu’s ‘cosmological Confucianism,’ the saying by 
Confucius that “Since heaven has not yet destroyed this culture, what can 
the men of Kuang do to me?” (Analects IX, 5) has to be understood as 
follows: As heaven is the ruler’s ultimate model and judge, it is heaven 
that bestows the ‘mandate of heaven’ (tianming) upon the ruler. When a 
ruler rules according to the dao of heaven, i.e. in a humane (ren) way, 
social disorder will be avoided. In the ideal Confucianist state, social 
hierarchy will be stable, to the extent that also the men of Kuang will act 
according to the proper rules of conduct. When the ruler does not rule in a 
humane way, this will, e.g., lead to it that the men of Kuang no longer act 
according to their proper lot. In such cases, it is heaven that will interfere 
and that has the ability to withdraw the ‘mandate of heaven’. 
3 Philosophy as a ‘Study of the Way of the Cosmos’ – 
The Philosopher as a Microcosmic Advisor for 
Maintaining Macrocosmic Order 
In its attempt to understand where man fits in the universe, Chinese phi-
losophy is not essentially different from early Greek philosophy. What is 
different, though, are the moral values with which this quest is laden.15 In 
ancient China, a cyclical concept of history was combined with a consis-
tent confidence in the eternal validity of the words of the wise men of 
antiquity. This resulted in it that Chinese philosophy was not oriented 
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towards the future. Rather, its main aim became explaining why the cos-
mos and man within this cosmos function as they do.16 In this context, 
Chinese philosophy developed into a profession of advising the ruler how 
to act according to the dao of heaven so as to keep good order in the 
cosmos. 
The social networks in which philosophers function within the Chi-
nese Confucian society are the natural outcome of the Confucian cosmo-
logical model. Chad Hansen (1985) describes Chinese society as charac-
terized by a part-whole structure, i.e., a structure in which each part is, by 
definition, part of something else. That ‘something else’ may, in its turn, 
be part of something still bigger. More concretely, the ‘parts’ are the in-
dividuals, and the ‘whole’ is a certain social relationship this particular 
individual has with a greater construct, be it the family in narrow sense, 
the family in larger sense, or society as a whole. From a philosophical 
point of view, we can extent this scheme to the cosmos at large, i.e., so-
ciety as a whole is part of the Confucian cosmological construct. Moreo-
ver, in a part-whole structure, each primary part can simultaneously be 
part of different constructs. The relation of the part to the whole is there-
fore not a single line of relationship, but a whole bundle of lines, in which 
each line represents a specific social relationship. With each of these 
lines, a separate Confucian behavioral code is connected.17 One of the 
outcomes of this process of living, as it were, in a web is that the web 
becomes part of the person. The self is embedded in relationships, inex-
tricable from it, and is not thought of as independent of such attachments. 
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(Redding 1993, p. 62) Put differently, a person’s identity is nothing else 
than the combined result of his social relations. 
Fei Xiaotong calls this type of social model a “differential mode of as-
sociation” (chaxugeju). To illustrate this kind of relationship, he uses the 
metaphor of the concentric circles that appear when throwing a rock into 
the water. (Fei 1992, pp. 62-63) Each individual is at the center of the 
circles produced by his or her own social influence. Everyone’s circles 
are interrelated, and one touches different circles at different times and 
places. In such a model, each interference of one’s own circles with those 
of another individual represents a different kind of relationship. To each 
interference, a specific moral behavior is attached. This corresponds with 
Dong Zhongshu’s concept of the universe as an organic whole in which 
every part is interrelated with every other part, and in which social order 
has to ensure that the relations between all constituent parts are kept in 
harmony.18 Therefore, the Chinese pattern of social organization embrac-
es no ethical concepts that transcend specific types of human relation-
ships (guanxi).19 Each relation of an individual with another individual or 
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 The Mohist view, centered on the concept of ‘jian’ai’ (universal love) does not 
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group is determined by the rules of conduct that are proper to this specific 
‘guanxi’.20 
Kwong-loi Shun differentiates four layers for an individual’s relation 
with society: (1) he knows social distinction, (2) he has to observe tradi-
tional norms that govern people’s behavior by virtue of social position (it 
is through participating in this social order and letting oneself be shaped 
by it that one becomes fully human), (3) his human relations are directed 
toward other human beings who are equally formed by the same social 
order, and (4) his cultivated character will have a transformative effect on 
other human beings. One’s own self-cultivation thus will have a trans-
formative effect on other things, and such effect is itself a measure of 
one’s progress in self-cultivation. Society thus both is the inspiration and 
the aim of an individual’s existence.21 As a consequence, the value of an 
individual is measured by his value for society, and the way to go beyond 
oneself and reach out to the world is “to extend oneself circle by circle”. 
(Fei 1992, p. 67) 
It is in this type of social context that we have to situate the rise of 
Chinese ‘schools’ of philosophy, with ‘philosophers’ increasingly becom-
ing advisors to the political elite in their performing of their duties of 
maintaining cosmic order. Obviously, for the ruler and the ruling elite, 
this part-whole relationship is extended to its utmost as the ruler is the 
ultimate intermediary between heaven, earth, and man. Within a value 
pattern stressing harmony and consensus, the key words in Chinese phi-
losophy being order, pattern, and organism,22 it comes as no surprise that 
what the ruling elite wanted from their ‘philosophers’ was advise and 
guidance for order and control. They wanted rational solutions for prac-
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tical problems, and a philosophical justification, found in the wise exam-
ples of antiquity, for their policies.23 For the ‘philosopher,’ it is the de-
gree of his moral self-education that allows him to function as such, a 
profession that allows him – through the ruler – to influence the lives of 
others. For the ruler himself, it is from the effective guidance of his philo-
sopher-advisor that he gains prestige as ruler and legitimation for his rule, 
i.e., through the beneficial outcome of his rule, as advised upon by the 
philosopher-advisor. Apart from this philosophical-political relationship, 
in which the ruling elite depended on the advise of ‘philosophers’ for 
their political prestige and survival, the ‘philosophers’ depended on the 
continued support of the elite for their livelihood. Ruler and philosopher 
thus were mutually dependent in their profession of keeping society har-
monious. The value of the social network of the philosopher thus became 
similar to the one of the ruler himself, and equally vulnerable. This fun-
damentally differs from the state of affairs in early Greece, where open 
debate was the norm.24  
In fact, the Han Dynasty only institutionalized the system of ‘patro-
nage’ as it had developed in the period leading to the first unification of 
the empire under the Qin Dynasty.25 A major difference, though, is that in 
the unified Han empire only one political philosophy was raised to offi-
cial status, while, in the preceding period, many rival ‘schools’ flou-
rished. From this period dates the so-called Jixia (lit. near the Ji [Gate of 
the Capital of the Qi state]) Academy, founded by Duke Huan, ruler of 
the feudal state Qi, in about 360 B.C.E.26 We should, however, not think 
of this Academy as a modern institute for learning.27 Duke Huan invited a 
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variety of scholars – Confucian and Daoist alike – to his court to give 
advice on political matters. The Academy therefore must have adopted a 
syncretistic approach. This model was continued during the Han Dynasty 
in the sense that it became institutionalized and bureaucraticized. In this 
process, the development of philosophy in different directions that had 
existed thanks to the many feudal states, each with their own rulers and 
the need for individual advisors, stopped, as Confucianism was shaped 
into the only possible line of thought. The eclectic climate of the Jixia 
Academy is hereby not without importance, however, for the formation 
of the ‘New Text School’ of Confucianism, combining Confucian con-
cepts with ideas of such other schools as the Five Phases, Yin-yang, and 
numerical categories. 
The bureaucratization of scholarship in the Han Dynasty further 
shaped the organization of the philosophical profession in ‘schools’ (jia) 
of thought. What belongs to a peculiar ‘school of thought’ is essentially 
based on the method knowledge was transmitted. On this, the 3rd century 
B.C.E. “Lüshi chunqiu” (“Spring and Autumn of the Lü Clan”) informs 
us as follows (Ershi’er zi 1988, 640a):  
In studying, one has to progress, so that there is no blindness in the mind. 
Recite [the texts] carefully. [...] Observe whether [the teacher] is happy, 
and [if so] ask him the meaning of the texts. Make your ears and eyes ob-
edient, and do not contradict his intention. Retreat from him, and think 
about what he has said.  
Two important elements can be seen in this passage: (1) transmitting 
knowledge was based on books, and (2) was aimed at accepting the 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
for intellectuals, comparable to a contemporary research center. However, so 
they claim, the only evidence to perceive of the Jixia Academy as such a centre, 
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teacher’s interpretation by the disciple. This is, of course, in line with the 
authority attributed to the words of the wise sages of antiquity.28 This 
importance of memorization was further stressed after, in the Qin Dynas-
ty, books had been burnt on demand of the emperor. Memorization was 
seen as the only way to preserve books. In this context, the concept of a 
book as a work written by one author is a late development. In China up 
to the first century C.E., books were texts that were accepted by and 
commented upon by a peculiar ‘school’ in accordance with their proper 
interpretations of the words of old sages.29 Membership of a ‘school’ was 
the prerequisite to gain knowledge and understanding of this interpreta-
tion. 
Chinese philosophy thus is not characterized as a “search for truth,” 
(Bauer 2006, p. 17) as the truth of the words of antiquity stands beyond 
doubt. Rather, Chinese philosophy is aimed at dealing with the world, 
conceived as a holistic whole, by advising to bring a specific and trans-
mitted interpretation of these words into practice.30 This also explains 
why the Chinese traditionally did not have a word that corresponds to our 
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 See Lloyd and Sivin 2002, p. 46. 
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 See also Lloyd and Sivin 2002, p. 73. Cheng 1997, p. 318, note 4: Concernant 
la notion d’écoles dans la Chine ancienne, Nathan Sivin (cf. Philosophy East and 
West, 42, 1, 1992, 27) remarque que, contrairement à la conception grecque de 
l’école formée d’orateurs et de polémistes sur la place publique, elle correspond 
bien plus à des classifications bibliographiques qu’à des groupements de per-
sonnes. En Chine, les écoles se distinguaient entre elles en ce qu’elles préser-
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transmission qui ressemblait fort à une filiation (d’où le mot jia qui désigne le 
clan)”. 
30
 Cheng 1997, p. 34: “Plutôt qu’un “savoir quoi” (c’est-à-dire une connaissance 
propositionelle qui aurait pour contenu idéal la vérité), la connaissance – conçue 
comme ce qui, sans en être encore, tend vers l’action – est avant tout un “savoir 
comment”: comment faire des distinctions afin de diriger sa vie et aménager 
l’espace social et cosmique à bon escient. Il ne s’agit donc pas d’une connais-
sance qui appréhende intellectuellement le sens d’une proposition, mais qui in-
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word ‘philosophy’. ‘Zhexue,’ the contemporary Chinese word for ‘phi-
losophy’ is a loan from the Japanese ‘tetsugaku,’ a translation of ‘philo-
sophia’. It literally means: ‘the study (xue) of knowing intuitively 
(zhe)’.31 This is reminiscent of the following passage of the eclectic 
Huainanzi, a work of the 2nd century B.C.E. (Ershi’er zi 1988, 1285a): 
What the intellect knows is petty, but it is depending on what is not 
known that illumination is [achieved]. 32 
The old Chinese word used to refer to the activity of explaining the order 
of the cosmos, i.e., of ‘philosophy’ in the sense described above, is simp-
ly ‘xue,’ commonly translated as ‘study’. For the Chinese philosopher, 
‘study’ is as much a moral as an intellectual activity.33 As the opening 
lines of the Confucian Analects, “Lunyu” read (Legge 1971, pp. 137):  
The Master said, ‘Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance 
and application?’ 
Further in the Analects, we read (book 1, chapter 1, vii; Legge 1971, pp. 
140-141):  
Zixia said, “If a man withdraws his mind from the love of beauty, and ap-
plies it as sincerely to the love of the virtuous; if, in serving his parents, 
he can exert his utmost strength; if, in serving his prince, he can devote 
his life; if, in his intercourse with his friends, his words are sincere: – al-
though men say that he has not learned, I will certainly say that he has”. 
This ‘study’ is also explained in the chapter “Daxue” of the Han Dynasty 
work “Liji” (Legge 1971, pp. 356-359): 
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 See also Bauer 2006, p. 18. See also Lloyd and Sivin 2002, p. 5. 
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 See also Lloyd and Sivin 2002, p. 192 and Sivin 1995, Chapter 5. 
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 See on this Lloyd and Sivin 2002, p. 5. 
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The dao of the ‘great learning’ (daxue)34 is making the light of virtue 
shine, is being as close to the people as one is to one’s own family, is only 
abiding in the highest good. When one knows where to abide, one can es-
tablish oneself; when one is established, one can be quiet. Quietude leads 
to peace; peace leads to deliberation; deliberation allows one to reach [the 
goal]. Every thing has its beginning and its end; every occasion has a be-
ginning and an end. The one who knows what comes first and what 
comes last is close to ‘dao’. In antiquity it was so that to let the light of 
virtue shine throughout the whole cosmos, one started to order one’s own 
territory. In order to regulate one’s own territory, one started to regulate 
one’s own house. In order to regulate one’s own house, one started to per-
fection oneself. In order to perfection oneself, one started with making 
one’s heart upright. In order to make one’s heart upright, one started with 
making one’s intention authentic. In order to make one’s intention authen-
tic, one started with developing one’s knowledge. Developing one’s 
knowledge was done by investigating things. It is through the investiga-
tion of things that knowledge reaches its greatest scope. Once knowledge 
is expanded, the heart becomes upright. It is through making one’s heart 
upright that one perfections oneself. It is through perfectioning oneself 
that one regulates one’s house. It is through regulating one’s house that 
one rules one’s territory. When the territory is ruled, all under heaven is in 
peace. The essential for both the son of heaven and the ordinary man is 
therefore to perfection oneself. It is impossible that one neglects the es-
sential and hopes to realize what is auxiliary. 
It is also in this line of thinking that we should interpret the famous Con-
fucian saying that, “With forty, I had no more doubt.” (Analects, II, 4). 
Doubt in the Confucian sense is not some methodological doubt, or doubt 
concerning a step in self-cultivation. Rather, doubt should be understood 
as emotional confusion, i.e., confusion regarding the ‘dao,’ i.e. confusion 
regarding the categorization of the world and one’s appropriate behavior 
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in this world.35 This type of confusion endangers the proper social beha-
vior, and the order in the cosmos.36 To go short, along with Dong Zhong-
shu’s interpretation of man as a ‘part’ in a part-whole relationship,37 the 
philosopher in China became the microcosmic advisor to the ruler for 
maintaining the macrocosmic order. 
4 The Consequences of Cosmological Confucianism 
for the Development of Science 
In Europe, a first fundamental step towards the development of science 
was brought about by Augustinus (354-430). Augustinus replaced the 
cyclical interpretation of time that characterized Greek antiquity with a 
linear time model. Taking the birth of Christ as focal point, time was 
presented as consisting of three periods: the period from Adam to Moses; 
the period from Moses to the birth of Christ; and the period from Christ 
to the end of the world. The resurrection of Christ symbolizes the untruth-
fullness of worldly life. Profane life is not meaningful an sich, but is only 
meaningful in its transcendental function.38 It is in the transcendent em-
pire of God that human beings will return to themselves.39 Another im-
portant element of Augustinus’s view of history, is its universalistic cha-
racter: all human beings suffer the same lot. History is no longer a histo-
ria gentium, but a totum genus humanum.40  
When, starting from the middle of the 15th century, the shift from 
scholastic thinking to Humanism and Renaissance set in, and the devel-
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 See Möller 1998/99, pp. 38-40. 
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 See Möller 1998/99, pp. 42. 
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 See Chan 1963, p. 271. 
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 See Crombie 1975, p. 218. See also Göller and Mittag 2008, p. 31. 
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opment of physical sciences revealed that both time and space are end-
less, the Augustinian view was challenged. This prepared the way for the 
thinking of the period of Enlightenment, with a renewed emphasis on the 
physical and sensual world.41 One important consequence of this devel-
opment was that man was seen as a creative actor in history. Personal 
freedom was understood to be a universal value, and the necessary requi-
site for man to act creatively.42 Along with the combined transfigurations 
of the Renaissance and the scientific revolution, came the Reformation 
and the rise of capitalism. Max Weber argues that, whereas Confucian-
ism, as we have demonstrated, wants to preserve the status quo, therefore 
concentrating the individual’s attention to the family and regulating his 
social behavior by means of a moral code, Protestantism advocated that 
trust in men could endanger the soul.43 Protestantism therefore provided 
the individual with a direct access to God: “A superior community of 
faith and a common ethical way of life were set against the community of 
blood relationships, and even against the family itself”. (Redding 1993, p. 
139) The restraint of the family bonds cast off, the individual could strife 
for personal wealth.  
This reshaped the European social organization. Where the Chinese 
society remained characterized by a part-whole relationship, the Euro-
pean society developed into a ‘one-many’ format, whereby the ‘many’ 
are the separate individuals, and the ‘one’ is the society.44 This format 
that is typical for capitalist societies, is called an “organizational mode of 
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 For reflections on the relation between the physical and the divine in this early 
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 See Casirer 1987, p. 46. 
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association” (tuantigeju) by Fei Xiaotong. (Fei 1992, p. 62) In a many-
one relationship, each individual has the same type of relation to the one. 
In this sense, the individuals are interchangeable. The social consequence 
of such a relationship for the individual is that, as it is not his relationship 
to the one that constitutes his uniqueness, his uniqueness lies in his indi-
vidualistic self. In other words, a many-one relationship is characteristic 
of an individualistic society. As is obvious from the above, this accentua-
tion of the individual is a rather recent development.45 
In modern Western societies, people attach themselves to preexisting 
organizations, and then, using that organizational structure, establish per-
sonal relationships with other individuals who are equally member of that 
same structure, or with individuals who are no member of that specific 
organization. All personal relations are determined by who is in and who 
is not in a certain organizational structure. That is to say, the fundamental 
concept of morality is, in the West, built on the relationship between the 
organization and the individual. An individual who joins an organization 
always keeps his individual rights. Therefore, whereas in traditional Chi-
na, the boundary between private and public has never been clear, the 
European state is an organization that creates distinct boundaries between 
the public and the private.46  
Such a development toward the rise of capitalism and individualism 
did not happen in Confucianist China.47 Even when prospects of a civil 
career diminished in the Later Han, thus opening up the possibilities for 
philosophical rivalry, the philosophical activity of the different teachers 
and their pupils lost itself in discussion on which interpretation was or-
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thodox, and ended in different lineages asserting their own positions, 
countering those of rivals without acknowledging them.48 
It is hardly imaginable that the cyclical thinking that characterizes 
Chinese philosophy did not have an effect on the development of a scien-
tific language and science. Within the early Chinese philosophical tradi-
tion, a few trends can be discerned in this respect.49 For Confucianists, 
language is normative and the reality is subject to language. Given the 
Confucianists’ bias towards the glorified past, this means that the words 
of the early sages are normative, and that reality has to be modeled on 
these words. Although the Confucian disciple Mencius “argued that lan-
guage did not represent an innate system which contained the essence of 
proper social norms that enabled people to live in a harmonic society,”50 
his moral epistemology was based on introspection. With this, he con-
forms to a second epistemological trend that is represented by the Daoist 
Laozi (ca. 300 B.C.E.) and the Confucianist Xunzi (298-238 B.C.E.). 
Also for them, language cannot express reality, and, hence, cannot be 
used as a conveyor of knowledge.51 This attitude re-iterates the quotation 
from the Lüshi chunqiu given above. 
Also the peculiar way the philosophical profession was organized in, 
influenced the development of science. It has been shown that the early 
scientific writings show government influence. This influence appears to 
have been the strongest in astronomy, which was essential to the opera-
tions of the state, and weakest in alchemy, which could count on no cen-
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 See Rošker 2008, pp. 1-37. 
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tral support except when a practitioner convinced an emperor that he 
could make him immortal.52 For the latter though, as the ancient classics, 
including medical classics, were thought to contain the wise words of old 
sages, also scientific knowledge in this field was aimed at transmission of 
this ancient knowledge along lineage (‘school’) lines.53 In traditional 
Chinese medicine, the human body was seen as a cosmos, and medical 
sciences served to maintain or restore good order in this cosmos. Medical 
sciences thus resemble philosophy and politics in the sense that also these 
serve to maintain or restore order in the cosmos. This concept of the hu-
man body explains why anatomic features were described as ‘offices’ in 
the central bureaucracy of the body, and somatic ‘posts’ (guan) were 
described in function of what they were in charge of (zhu).54 
Before the modern times, the Chinese not only had no word for 
‘science,’ but they had no word for ‘nature’ in the sense of the physical or 
material universe neither. The classical word ‘ziran,’ denoting ‘nature’ 
means as much as ‘what exists as such (ran) without external cause (zi)” 
and was only used in the sense of ‘nature’ starting from 1881, when it 
was borrowed from the Japanese who, in their turn, used the word to 
translate Western textbooks.55 The earliest Chinese word for ‘science’ 
was the transliteration ‘sai’ensi’, that was replaced by the term ‘kexue’ in 
the early 20th century. (Wilkinson 2000, p. 38) All this notwithstanding, 
the Chinese concern for the practical useful stimulated the advance of 
technology as much as it did in the West. This kind of development, 
however, has nothing to do with the unique development of rational 
scientific method in Europe starting with the scientific revolution referred 
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to above. Also in the West, this development is as complex as it is 
unique.56 
5 Conclusion 
The way things were traditionally “understood” in China began with the 
idea of a permanent cosmic order. “Understanding” meant understanding 
where in a scheme something fits. This scheme was founded on the con-
cept that things belong to groups of relations. Knowledge in the Chinese 
tradition therefore was essentially conceived to be skill-knowledge: 
“knowing (how) to.” The organization of philosophy and science fol-
lowed the same structures as did the political and economical organiza-
tion of the state, a structure that is characterized by a part-whole relation-
ship. In the same way as the Chinese economical and social model is a 
model aimed at the status quo, also the traditional scientific model there-
fore spirals around a status quo. 
Ghent University 
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